Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment

Institutional incentives are widely used to promote cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents, from human societies to multi-agent and AI systems. Existing work typically treats incentive design as a bi-objective problem: minimise institutional cost while achieving a high long-run frequency of cooperation. Whether such schemes also maximise social welfare - total population payoff net of institutional expenditure - has remained largely unexplored. We develop a welfare-centric framework for institutional incentives in finite, well-mixed populations playing a social dilemma (Donation Game and Public Goods Game), considering both rewards for cooperators and punishments for defectors. For each mechanism, we derive explicit expressions for expected social welfare and characterise how it depends on incentive efficiency and selection intensity. Analytically, we identify parameter regimes where social welfare has a single optimal incentive level and regimes with qualitative phase transitions, in which welfare becomes non-monotonic with multiple local optima. We prove that any welfare-maximising incentive is either zero or concentrated around a simple closed-form target, and we provide an efficient algorithm to compute these optima. Comparing reward and punishment, we further derive close-formed conditions under which reward outperform punishment in terms of social welfare for any given budget. Overall, our results reveal a systematic gap between incentives optimised for cost or cooperation frequency and those that maximise welfare.

Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality

The growing integration of AI into cybersecurity is reshaping the balance between attackers and defenders. When access to advanced AI-enabled defence tools is uneven, resource-limited defenders may be unable to adopt effective protection, creating persistent system vulnerabilities. We study the impact of differential AI access using an evolutionary game-theoretic model in a finite population. We first show that when high-capability defence is costly, the population is driven toward low-cost, weak-defence behaviour, sustaining attacks and weakening long-run security. To address this problem, we introduce differential access to AI defence tools by allowing defenders to choose between low- and high-capability protection based on their resources. We then examine the role of a small group of committed defenders who always adopt strong defence and influence others through social learning. Although commitment increases the prevalence of strong defence, it alone cannot stabilise secure outcomes due to high defence costs. We therefore incorporate a targeted subsidy to remove the cost disadvantage from committed defenders. Our analysis shows that subsidised commitment significantly increases strong defence adoption, suppresses successful attacks, and improves overall system resilience. Simulations across a broad parameter space confirm that subsidies consistently outperform commitment alone. In addition, social-welfare analysis shows improved defender outcomes while keeping attacker gains low. These findings suggest that targeted support for key defenders can be an effective mechanism for stabilising cybersecurity in AI-driven environments and provide a theoretical bridge between cybersecurity policy, AI governance, and strategic allocation of defensive AI capabilities.

Tracking High-order Evolutions via Cascading Low-rank Fitting

Diffusion models have become the de facto standard for modern visual generation, including well-established frameworks such as latent diffusion and flow matching. Recently, modeling high-order dynamics has emerged as a promising frontier in generative modeling. Rather than only learning the first-order velocity field that transports random noise to a target data distribution, these approaches simultaneously learn higher-order derivatives, such as acceleration and jerk, yielding a diverse family of higher-order diffusion variants. To represent higher-order derivatives, naive approaches instantiate separate neural networks for each order, which scales the parameter space linearly with the derivative order. To overcome this computational bottleneck, we introduce cascading low-rank fitting, an ordinary differential equation inspired method that approximates successive derivatives by applying a shared base function augmented with sequentially accumulated low-rank components. Theoretically, we analyze the rank dynamics of these successive matrix differences. We prove that if the initial difference is linearly decomposable, the generic ranks of high-order derivatives are guaranteed to be monotonically non-increasing. Conversely, we demonstrate that without this structural assumption, the General Leibniz Rule allows ranks to strictly increase. Furthermore, we establish that under specific conditions, the sequence of derivative ranks can be designed to form any arbitrary permutation. Finally, we present a straightforward algorithm to efficiently compute the proposed cascading low-rank fitting.

Trust as Monitoring: Evolutionary Dynamics of User Trust and AI Developer Behaviour

AI safety is an increasingly urgent concern as the capabilities and adoption of AI systems grow. Existing evolutionary models of AI governance have primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation, typically representing users' trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking AI behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how user trust strategies and developer choices between safe (compliant) and unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We complement the infinite-population replicator analysis with stochastic finite-population dynamics and reinforcement learning (Q-learning) simulations. Across these approaches, we find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption with unsafe development, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent evolutionary drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

Sublinear Time Quantum Algorithm for Attention Approximation

Given the query, key and value matrices $Q, K, V\in \mathbb{R}^{n\times d}$, the attention module is defined as $\mathrm{Att}(Q, K, V)=D^{-1}AV$ where $A=\exp(QK^\top/\sqrt{d})$ with $\exp(\cdot)$ applied entrywise, $D=\mathrm{diag}(A{\bf 1}_n)$. The attention module is the backbone of modern transformers and large language models, but explicitly forming the softmax matrix $D^{-1}A$ incurs $Ω(n^2)$ time, motivating numerous approximation schemes that reduce runtime to $\widetilde O(nd)$ via sparsity or low-rank factorization. We propose a quantum data structure that approximates any row of $\mathrm{Att}(Q, K, V)$ using only row queries to $Q, K, V$. Our algorithm preprocesses these matrices in $\widetilde{O}\left( ε^{-1} n^{0.5} \left( s_λ^{2.5} + s_λ^{1.5} d + α^{0.5} d \right) \right)$ time, where $ε$ is the target accuracy, $s_λ$ is the $λ$-statistical dimension of the exponential kernel defined by $Q$ and $K$, and $α$ measures the row distortion of $V$ that is at most $d/{\rm srank}(V)$, the stable rank of $V$. Each row query can be answered in $\widetilde{O}(s_λ^2 + s_λd)$ time. To our knowledge, this is the first quantum data structure that approximates rows of the attention matrix in sublinear time with respect to $n$. Our approach relies on a quantum Nyström approximation of the exponential kernel, quantum multivariate mean estimation for computing $D$, and quantum leverage score sampling for the multiplication with $V$.

Which Coauthor Should I Nominate in My 99 ICLR Submissions? A Mathematical Analysis of the ICLR 2026 Reciprocal Reviewer Nomination Policy

The rapid growth of AI conference submissions has created an overwhelming reviewing burden. To alleviate this, recent venues such as ICLR 2026 introduced a reviewer nomination policy: each submission must nominate one of its authors as a reviewer, and any paper nominating an irresponsible reviewer is desk-rejected. We study this new policy from the perspective of author welfare. Assuming each author carries a probability of being irresponsible, we ask: how can authors (or automated systems) nominate reviewers to minimize the risk of desk rejections? We formalize and analyze three variants of the desk-rejection risk minimization problem. The basic problem, which minimizes expected desk rejections, is solved optimally by a simple greedy algorithm. We then introduce hard and soft nomination limit variants that constrain how many papers may nominate the same author, preventing widespread failures if one author is irresponsible. These formulations connect to classical optimization frameworks, including minimum-cost flow and linear programming, allowing us to design efficient, principled nomination strategies. Our results provide the first theoretical study for reviewer nomination policies, offering both conceptual insights and practical directions for authors to wisely choose which co-author should serve as the nominated reciprocal reviewer.

Evaluating Frontier LLMs on PhD-Level Mathematical Reasoning: A Benchmark on a Textbook in Theoretical Computer Science about Randomized Algorithms

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has led to significant breakthroughs in automated mathematical reasoning and scientific discovery. Georgiev, G${ó}$mez-Serrano, Tao, and Wagner [GGSTW+25] demonstrate that AI systems can explore new constructions and improve existing bounds, illustrating the growing potential of LLMs to accelerate mathematical discovery. Similarly, Bubeck et al. [BCE+25] show that GPT-5 can meaningfully contribute to scientific workflows, from proposing hypotheses to generating proofs and analyses. Despite these advances, a rigorous evaluation of these models on canonical, graduate-level mathematical theory remains necessary to understand their baseline reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we present a comprehensive benchmark of four frontier models: GPT-5-Thinking, Gemini-3-Pro, Claude-Sonnet-4.5-Thinking, and Grok-4 against the classic curriculum of Randomized Algorithms by Motwani and Raghavan [MR95]. We tasked each model with generating formal LaTeX proofs for a series of lemmas and exercises spanning the textbook. We find that while the top-tier models (Gemini, and Claude) achieve a high accuracy rate (approx. 66%), demonstrating a robust grasp of probabilistic method and formal logic, other models lag significantly in consistency (approx. 40%). We provide a qualitative analysis of the generated proofs, highlighting differences in conciseness, hallucination rates, and logical structure. Our results suggest that while frontier models have reached a threshold of proficiency suitable for graduate-level pedagogical assistance and formalization, significant variance exists in their reliability for rigorous mathematical derivation. The code and the full set of LLM-generated responses are open-sourced and publicly available at https://github.com/magiclinux/math_benchmark_probability.

Social welfare optimisation in well-mixed and structured populations

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal value of social welfare under such constraints remains largely unexplored. In this work, we hypothesise that achieving maximal social welfare is not guaranteed at the minimal incentive cost required to drive agents to a desired cooperative state. To address this gap, we adopt to a single-objective approach focused on maximising social welfare, building upon foundational evolutionary game theory models that examined cost efficiency in finite populations, in both well-mixed and structured population settings. Our analytical model and agent-based simulations show how different interference strategies, including rewarding local versus global behavioural patterns, affect social welfare and dynamics of cooperation. Our results reveal a significant gap in the per-individual incentive cost between optimising for pure cost efficiency or cooperation frequency and optimising for maximal social welfare. Overall, our findings indicate that incentive design, policy, and benchmarking in multi-agent systems and human societies should prioritise welfare-centric objectives over proxy targets of cost or cooperation frequency.

Your Vision-Language Model Can't Even Count to 20: Exposing the Failures of VLMs in Compositional Counting

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have become a central focus of today's AI community, owing to their impressive abilities gained from training on large-scale vision-language data from the Web. These models have demonstrated strong performance across diverse tasks, including image understanding, video understanding, complex visual reasoning, and embodied AI. Despite these noteworthy successes, a fundamental question remains: Can VLMs count objects correctly? In this paper, we introduce a simple yet effective benchmark, VLMCountBench, designed under a minimalist setting with only basic geometric shapes (e.g., triangles, circles) and their compositions, focusing exclusively on counting tasks without interference from other factors. We adopt strict independent variable control and systematically study the effects of simple properties such as color, size, and prompt refinement in a controlled ablation. Our empirical results reveal that while VLMs can count reliably when only one shape type is present, they exhibit substantial failures when multiple shape types are combined (i.e., compositional counting). This highlights a fundamental empirical limitation of current VLMs and motivates important directions for future research.

A Theoretical Analysis of Discrete Flow Matching Generative Models

We provide a theoretical analysis for end-to-end training Discrete Flow Matching (DFM) generative models. DFM is a promising discrete generative modeling framework that learns the underlying generative dynamics by training a neural network to approximate the transformative velocity field. Our analysis establishes a clear chain of guarantees by decomposing the final distribution estimation error. We first prove that the total variation distance between the generated and target distributions is controlled by the risk of the learned velocity field. We then bound this risk by analyzing its two primary sources: (i) Approximation Error, where we quantify the capacity of the Transformer architecture to represent the true velocity, and (ii) Estimation Error, where we derive statistical convergence rates that bound the error from training on a finite dataset. By composing these results, we provide the first formal proof that the distribution generated by a trained DFM model provably converges to the true data distribution as the training set size increases.